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| | CIA T.S. CONTROL NUMBER SOVA TS 3034 85 | CIA COPY NUMBER 1 | DOCUMENT DATE 24 Oct 85 | DATE RECEIVED 25 Nov 85 | | | | |
| NO. PAGES Pages 9-16 Only | NO. OF ATTACHMENTS (CIA T.S. # of Attachment) | | BRANCH, BADGE #, OR LOCATION ILL Registry | LOGGED BY Bco/OLL | | | | |
| SUBJECT: Soviet View of U.S. Binary Program | | | | | | | | |
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DC/LD
C/LDOLL 85-³⁶⁹²
23 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing on Soviet CW Capabilities

1. A briefing was held on 23 October 1985, in Room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building for members and staff of the House Appropriations Committee. The subject of the briefing was the Soviet chemical warfare capabilities and intentions. Internal security in the hearing room was provided by an Agency security team.

2. The following attended the hearing:

MEMBERS

Rep Joe Skeen (R., NM)
" Bill Green (R., NY)
" Robert Livingston (R., LA)
" Eldon Rudd (R., AZ)
" Bill Young (R., FL)

STAFF & OTHERS

Ben Haddad
Mark Kirk
Dave Willson
Major Dennis Rankin
Michelle Giguere
Robert Boyle
Paul Cambon
Doug Gregory
Mary Hamilton

CIA

Doug MacEachin, DI/SOVA
 DI/SOVA
 DI/SOVA
 CI/OLL

3. Doug MacEachin opened the meeting with a brief statement [attachment 1]. followed with a more lengthy statement, which he read to the members and staffers present [attachment 2]. The meeting was then opened up for questions and discussion. (Note: Staffer Mark Kirk had provided a list of questions to the members as they entered the room [attachment 3]. Some of these questions were answered

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
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during the presentation at the beginning; others were asked explicitly by Mr. Kirk.) [REDACTED]

4. The range of questions posed was widespread and quite diverse. The following are some of the main points covered in responding to these questions:

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Opening remarks by Mr. MacEachin

As on any serious issue, there are some different views in the Intelligence Community on Soviet plans and capabilities for use of chemical weapons. But there is substantial agreement--agreement on what really are the central questions. For example:

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1. CIA, along with the rest of the Community, believes the USSR has a significant chemical weapons capability. [REDACTED] and in fact the largest in the world. Such differences as there are in the Community on this score concern how much larger--how many times larger--not whether. Moreover, even those differences have narrowed as a result of continuing work since the last official Community estimate.

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2. The Soviets continue to modernize their chemical warfare capability-- [REDACTED] will touch on this.

3. The Soviets recognize and respect the value of deterrence--and this has played a central role in Soviet calculations.

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5. Finally, the Community agrees that an area of increasing concern is the proliferation of chemical weapons.

These remarks are classified SECRET
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